East Asia and the Pacific: Maritime Issues and Sovereignty Disputes in East Asia Wed, 15 Jul 2009 14:38:45 -0500 Maritime Issues and Sovereignty Disputes in East Asia Scot Marciel Deputy Assistant Secretary Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Statement Before Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Committee, Senate Foreign Relations Washington, DC July 15, 2009 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Chairman Webb and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to testify before you today on maritime and sovereignty issues in East Asia. The sea lanes that run through East Asia are some of the world’s busiest and most strategically important. They serve as the prime arteries of trade that have fueled the tremendous economic growth of the region and brought prosperity to the U.S. economy as well. Billions of dollars of commerce -- much of Asia’s trade with the world, including the United States – flows annually through those waters. Over half of the world’s merchant fleet by tonnage sails through the South China Sea alone each year. The United States has long had a vital interest in maintaining stability, freedom of navigation, and the right to lawful commercial activity in East Asia’s waterways. For decades, active U.S. engagement in East Asia, including the forward-deployed presence of U.S. forces, has been a central factor in keeping the peace and preserving those interests. That continues to be true today. Through diplomacy, commerce, and our military presence, we have protected vital U.S. interests. Our relationships with our allies remain strong, the region is at peace, and – as you know well -- the U.S. Navy continues to carry out the full range of missions necessary to protect our country and preserve our interests. Our presence and our policy have also aimed to support respect for international maritime law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Although the United States has yet to ratify the Convention, as you know Mr. Chairman, this Administration and its predecessors support doing so, and in practice, our vessels comply with its provisions governing traditional uses of the oceans. Issues surrounding maritime and sovereignty disputes in East Asia are multifaceted and complex. With your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I am going to focus on three topics: --First, the multiple sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea; --Second, recent incidents involving China and the activities of U.S. naval vessels in international waters within that country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ); --And finally, the strategic context of these distinct topics and how the United States should respond. China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei each claim sovereignty over parts of the South China Sea, including its land features. The size of each party’s claim varies widely, as does the intensity with which they assert it. The claims center on sovereignty over the 200 small islands, rocks and reefs that make up the Paracel and Spratly Islands chains. Sovereignty disputes notwithstanding, the South China Sea is largely at peace. Tensions among rival claimants rise and fall. To date, the disputes have not led to sustained military conflict. In 2002, the ASEAN countries and China signed the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.” While non-binding, it set out useful principles, such as that all claimants should “resolve disputes…by peaceful means” and “exercise self-restraint,” and that they “reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea, as provided for by the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.” More importantly, the 2002 document signaled a willingness among claimants to approach the dispute multilaterally. We welcomed this agreement, which lowered tensions among claimants and strengthened ASEAN as an institution. It has not eliminated tensions, nor has it eliminated unilateral actions by claimants in the South China Sea, but it’s a start, and a good basis on which to address conflict in the region diplomatically. U.S. policy continues to be that we do not take sides on the competing legal claims over territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea. In other words, we do not take sides on the claims to sovereignty over the islands and other land features in the South China Sea, or the maritime zones (such as territorial seas) that derive from those land features. We do, however, have concerns about claims to “territorial waters” or any maritime zone that does not derive from a land territory. Such maritime claims are not consistent with international law, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. We remain concerned about tension between China and Vietnam, as both countries seek to tap potential oil and gas deposits that lie beneath the South China Sea. Starting in the summer of 2007, China told a number of U.S. and foreign oil and gas firms to stop exploration work with Vietnamese partners in the South China Sea or face unspecified consequences in their business dealings with China. We object to any effort to intimidate U.S. companies. During a visit to Vietnam in September 2008, then-Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte asserted the rights of U.S. companies operating in the South China Sea, and stated that we believe that disputed claims should be dealt with peacefully and without resort to any type of coercion. We have raised our concerns with China directly. Sovereignty disputes between nations should not be addressed by attempting to pressure companies that are not party to the dispute. We have also urged that all claimants exercise restraint and avoid aggressive actions to resolve competing claims. We have stated clearly that we oppose the threat or use of force to resolve the disputes, as well as any action that hinders freedom of navigation. We would like to see a resolution in accordance with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. There are various other maritime-related disputes in East Asia. Japan and China have differences over EEZ limits in the East China Sea, and sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. These disputes have drawn less attention than those in the South China Sea. We continue to monitor developments on all of these maritime disputes, as quarrels over sovereignty can escalate quickly in a region where nationalist sentiment runs strong. I would now like to discuss recent incidents involving China and the activities of U.S. vessels in international waters within that country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In March 2009, the survey ship USNS Impeccable was conducting routine operations, consistent with international law, in international waters in the South China Sea. Actions taken by Chinese fishing vessels to harass the Impeccable put ships of both sides at risk, interfered with freedom of navigation, and were inconsistent with the obligation for ships at sea to show due regard for the safety of other ships. We immediately protested those actions to the Chinese government, and urged that our differences be resolved through established mechanisms for dialogue – not through ship-to-ship confrontations that put sailors and vessels at risk. Our concern over that incident centered on China’s conception of its legal authority over other countries’ vessels operating in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the unsafe way China sought to assert what it considers its maritime rights. China’s view of its rights on this specific point is not supported by international law. We have made that point clearly in discussions with the Chinese and underscored that U.S. vessels will continue to operate lawfully in international waters as they have done in the past. I would note that there have been no further incidents of harassment by Chinese fishing vessels since mid-May. In closing, I would like to look at both these concerns – the EEZ concerns with China and the overlapping South China Sea claims – in a broader strategic context. Specifically, what do these issues signify for international law and for the evolving power dynamics in East Asia, and how should the United States respond? The Impeccable incident and the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea are distinct issues that require distinct policy responses from the United States. On a strategic level, to an extent, both issues highlight a growing assertiveness by China in regard to what it sees as its maritime rights. In some cases, we do not share or even understand China’s interpretation of international maritime law. We believe that there are constructive ways, however, to tackle these difficult issues. With respect to freedom of navigation in the EEZ by U.S. naval vessels, we have urged China to address our differences through dialogue. Last month at the Defense Consultative Talks in Beijing, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy raised this issue, and the Chinese agreed to hold a special session of our Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (signed in 1998) to take up this issue and seek to resolve differences. In the case of the conflicting sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, we have encouraged all parties to pursue solutions in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and other agreements already made between ASEAN and China. The assertions of a number of claimants to South China Sea territory raise important and sometimes troubling questions for the international community regarding access to sea-lanes and marine resources. There is considerable ambiguity in China’s claim to the South China Sea, both in terms of the exact boundaries of its claim and whether it is an assertion of territorial waters over the entire body of water, or only over its land features. In the past, this ambiguity has had little impact on U.S. interests. It has become a concern, however, with regard to the pressure on our energy firms, as some of the offshore blocks that have been subject to Chinese complaint do not appear to lie within China’s claim. It might be helpful to all parties if China provided greater clarity on the substance of its claims. We need to be vigilant to ensure our interests are protected and advanced. When we have concerns, we will raise them candidly, as we have done over the pressuring of our companies. We note that China has taken a more conciliatory approach to resolving some disputes over its land borders. Last year, for example, China and Vietnam concluded a land border demarcation agreement. China’s general diplomatic approach to Southeast Asia has emphasized friendship and good-neighborliness. Likewise, China’s anti-piracy deployment to the Gulf of Aden has been a positive contribution to a common international concern. We are encouraged by these steps, and hope that China will apply the same constructive approach to its maritime rights and boundaries. We have a broad relationship with China, Mr. Chairman, which encompasses many issues of vital strategic importance to both countries. We agree closely on some issues; on others, we frankly have differences. Our bilateral relationship can accommodate and respect those differences, and address them responsibly through dialogue. Thank you for your time, and I am pleased to answer your questions.   more »

March 09, 2009 Mr. PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, webmaster@mfa.gov.cn Mrs. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, support@govdelivery.com The Legacy of The Republic of Viet Nam (LRVN) declares its sovereignty over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 200 nautical miles according to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea that continues from the continental shelf of Viet Nam stretching to the surrounding Paracel archipelago waters. As LRVN affirms in many official letters to the United Nations, The PRC will be responsible for any incidents over the the LRVN claimed sovereignty in this sea route. The LRVN requested that the PRC must be cautious in any naval activities that can cause any connfrontation with any naval forces that operate the civil and unarmed surveys in our EEZ, and warned the PRC of using its naval forces to do any risky actions that can tamper the peace in the East Sea. Song Hong, Editor of NewsForce1 The Legacy of the Republic of Viet Nam CONTINUES IN VIETNAMESE ************************************************** UPDATE: Here is a viewpoint from John E. Carey (a U.S. Navy veteran) http://arturoafc54.wordpress.com/2009/03/10/china-wants-us-out-of-international-waters-it-consides-a-china-lake/    more »

Ngày 16 tháng 7 vừa qua, nhân tháng 7 là tháng Việt Nam làm Chủ Tịch luân phiên HĐBA LHQ, một số chính đảng ở hải ngoại đã khởi xướng chiến dịch gửi Thư Ngỏ đến HĐBA và ông TTK LHQ để đưa ra vấn đề Trung Cộng xâm chiếm quần đảo Hoàng Sa và Trường Sa của Việt Nam, kêu gọi HĐBA, với trọng trách bảo vệ an ninh và hòa bình của thế giới “hãy đưa ra những biện pháp thích ứng để ngăn chận ngay lập tức những hành động xâm lấn của Trung Quốc đối với Việt Nam, đồng thời giúp đưa ra giải pháp để giải quyết một cách công bằng tình trạng thiệt hại hiện nay của nước Việt Nam." Thư Ngỏ cũng đặt trách nhiệm của chính quyền CSVN trong việc để Trung Cộng xâm chiếm lãnh thổ và lãnh hải Việt Nam, buộc Hà Nội phải có thái độ đối với Trung Cộng. Chiến dịch Thư Ngỏ đã được sự ủng hộ nồng nhiệt của người Việt khắp nơi. Ngay vào lúc 2 giờ trưa (giờ New York, Hoa Kỳ) Thứ Tư, 16 tháng 7, 36 tiếng đồng hồ sau khi soạn thảo, đã có 30 đoàn thể chính trị, cộng đồng, và chuyên biệt tham gia ký tên vào Thư Ngỏ. Trong số này có 3 đoàn thể trong nước là Liên-minh Dân-chủ và Nhân-quyền Việt Nam, Khối 8406 và Đảng Dân Chủ Việt Nam Thế Kỷ XXI. Thư Ngỏ được fax trực tiếp và khẩn cấp đến văn phòng TTK LHQ, năm thành viên thường trực (Hoa Kỳ, Anh, Pháp, Nga và TC), và các thành viên không thường trực của HĐBA LHQ (Bỉ, Burkina Faso, Costa Rica, Croatia, Lybia, Nam Dương, Nam Phi, Panama, Ý và Việt Nam). Thư Ngỏ được gửi đến LHQ 1 ngày trước khi Phạm Gia Khiêm, Ngoại trường Việt Nam, đến LHQ. Tính đến 12 giờ đêm 30 tháng 7, ngày tổng kết chiến dịch Thư Ngỏ tháng Bảy, tổng số đoàn thể ký tên vào Thư Ngỏ đã tăng lên thành 91 trong đó có 4 đoàn thể từ trong nước. Sáng 31 tháng 7, Thư Ngỏ cùng danh sách tổng kết các đoàn thể trong-ngoài nước tham gia ký tên đã được gửi đến HĐBA và ông TTK LHQ để chấm dứt chiến dịch. Dưới đây là bản văn tiếng Việt và tiếng Anh Thư Ngỏ và danh sách tổng kết (trong bản tiếng Việt) các đoàn thể đã tham gia ký tên. We represent a number of Vietnamese political parties and mass organizations, both inside and outside of Vietnam, joined by independent Vietnamese personalities who would like to specially call to the attention of the UN Security Council the provocations and aggressive actions that the People’s Republic of China has taken towards two archipelagoes in Vietnam’s Eastern Sea (aka South China Sea). Specifically, these actions are: 1. On 19 January 1974, the Chinese Navy blatantly took over the Paracel Islands belonging to the then Republic of Vietnam. Seventy-one Vietnamese naval personnel lost their lives and another 28 were wounded as a result of this aggression. The Chinese occupation of these islands has lasted to this day. 2. On 14 March 1988, China made another aggressive move by occupying some major islands in the Spratly Islands belonging to Vietnam. In this encounter, 64 Vietnamese personnel were killed and another 11 wounded. 3. In early December 2007, China created the district of Sansha in Hainan Province to administer three archipelagoes in Vietnam’s Eastern Sea/South China Sea, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands. With this action, China sought not only to perpetuate its illegal occupation of many islands belonging to Vietnam but also to unlawfully annex these islands to Chinese territory.   more »

News Brief #1 Saigon on the Eve of the Olympic Torch Relay On April 28, 2008, amidst preparations for the highly anticipated arrival of the 2008 Olympic Torch Relay through the streets of Saigon, Vietnamese citizens have become increasing aware of the heighten sense of unease among the city’s public security officials. Around 9pm, security police swamped the historic Saigon Norte Dame Basilica, the downtown Opera House, and the Bach Dang station in anticipation of large scale protests. When they realized they had been mistaken, security police encircled the Saigon Opera House and the Chinese Consulate. Currently there is a large police presence at each location numbering in the thousands. Cars passing by are being inspected. Police have also cordoned off the major boulevards of Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, Pham Ngoc Thach, Tran Hung Dao and Le Loi. Students and youth in Saigon continue to form small groups to follow the deployment of security officials and look for the best locations to gather without prior coordination. Perhaps this is what has worried security officials. They have tried to detain or isolate those believed to be youth leaders. In the last 24 hours, blogger Dong A, college student Le Ngoc Ho Diep, college student Hoang Duc Tuong, among others, have been detained at their local police station. Police have also prevented democracy activists from across the country from gathering in to Saigon to protest China including writer Nguyen Xuan Nghia and Pham Thi Thanh Nghien in Hai Phong; Nguyen Phuong Anh, Lu Thi Thu Duyen in Hanoi; Trinh Thi Phuong Thuy, wife of imprisoned democracy activist Nguyen Phong, in Hue; and engineer Do Nam Hai in Saigon. The unease of Vietnamese security officials and discontent among the populace led Beijing to make a concession in the last 24 hours. Olympic organizers modified the torch relay map, which had visibly portrayed the Spratly and Paracel Islands as part of China. The edited maps can be seen at http://torchrelay.beijing2008.cn/en/journey/map/. ************************************************************** Radio New Horizon www.radiochantroimoi.com http://radiochantroimoi.wordpress.com/ News Brief #2 Outpouring of Patriotism in Hanoi and Saigon Consideration for Beijing by Communist Party and Government At 9 o’clock in Hanoi on April 29, 2008, about 150 people including democracy activists, aggrieved farmers and families of fishermen from Thanh Hoa province that were killed by the Chinese navy on the Eastern sea, gathered in front of Dong Xuan market protesting against Chinese aggression and invasion of the Spratly and Paracel islands. The protests brought banners, including a large black and white showing five Olympic rings rendered as handcuffs. They also brought megaphones to call for people to participate. Only 15 minutes later, more than 300 security police rushed in to snatch slogans; tearing down banners; twisting arms and bashing people in the protest. Please listen to the report from poet Tran Duc Thach: http://www.radiochantroimoi.com/audio/2008/04/ducthach2.mp3/ The police later arrested all those who were thought organizing the protest, including writer Nguyen Xuan Nghia, teacher Vu Hung, students Ngo Quynh and Tien Nam, Vi Duc Hoi, Kim Thu….at level 1, Dong Xuan Market. At 10 o’clock, police escorted all those that were arrested by cars back to Hanoi’s police station at 87 Tran Hung Dao Street. Meanwhile, those remain had moved to Dong Xuan market rather than going home. At 10:30am on April 29, security police came to arrest more than 100 people in front of Dong Xuan market including poet Tran Duc Thach, Do Duy Thong, Chau, Kieu, Nguyen Ba Dang, Tuc, students Nhat, Toan, Vy and all fishermen from Thanh Hoa, aggrieved farmers from Mai Xuan Thuong, teacher delegation from Ha Dong, students from Hai Phong…etc. Everyone was packed into police cars and transported back to Hanoi’s police station at 87 Tran Hung Dao Street for interrogation. The brutal nature of 300 police astounded the protest. People were shocked by the determination of the Vietnamese authorities and the police in trying to repress patriots, to save face for Beijing. But these brutalities were not able to deter the people. Please listen to democracy activist Duong Thi Xuan announced the sentiments of the protest at Dong Xuan market: http://www.radiochantroimoi.com/audio/2008/04/DuongTXuan.mp3/ In the mean time, the situation in Saigon becomes tenser. Police is now allowed to burst into shops along the street to arrest people without the need for warrant. As it comes closer to the ceremonial sites and toward the end of the Olympic Torch Relay, only Chinese tourists can be seen walking around freely, whereas all Vietnamese are watched with suspicion. Some were sent away, others were taken into police custody. Updated at 3pm Vietnam, April 29, 2008.   more »

Attn : Count Jacques Rogge President Subject: Request to De-politicise the Beijing2008 Olympics Dear Mr. President, First of all, I am proud and delighted to inform you that I will be one of sixty Vietnamese nationals carrying the 2008 Beijing Olympic torch through Ho Chi Minh City on the coming 29th April 2008. It is my great honour to have been chosen as a bearer of the Olympic torch – the symbol of olympism, of peace and of solidarity of all people in the world – which will be relayed in Vietnam for the first time. However, after studying closely the Planned Route Map for the Beijing 2008 Olympic and Paralympic Torch Relay published on the official website of the BOCOG, I find that the torch that I will bear is not the torch of pure olympism, but it is a torch of an olympism politicized by the the Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (“BOCOG”). Even in hosting the 2008 Olympic and Paralymic games, China has not missed the opportunity to politicize the Olympic and Paralymic Games. Via the official website of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China deceives the world that they have sovereignty over the Paracel islands, an area which China illegitimately took from Vietnam in 1974. I will prove this to you through the following: ... Le Minh Phieu A Beijing 2008 Olympic torch-bearer Ph.D Candidate at Center for European and International Documentation and Research Post-graduate School of Law – Bordeaux IV – Montesquieu University Avenue Léon Duguit, 33600 Pessac, France Published by Andrew Lam at New America Media on April 14, 2008; http://blogs.newamericamedia.org/andrew-lam/1144/letter-to-mr-president-of-olympic-international-committe UPDATE: Mr. Le Minh Phieu was interviewed by RFA yesterday and has decided to appear in the torch relay. Vigils are being planned to coincide with the Olympic torch presence in Saigon on April 29.    more »

China: Verdict on Activist Hu Jia statement by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on April 3, 2008: The United States is dismayed by the sentence of three and a half years in prison announced today in the case of prominent Chinese human rights activist Hu Jia under the specious charge of 'inciting subversion of state power.' Mr. Hu has consistently worked within China’s legal system to protect the rights of his fellow citizens. These types of activities support China’s efforts to institute the rule of law and should be applauded, not suppressed or punished. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice pressed Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi for Hu’s immediate release during her February visit to China, and U.S. officials continue to take every opportunity to raise our concerns about Mr. Hu’s case with Chinese officials at all levels, both in Beijing and in Washington, D.C. In this Olympic year, we urge China to seize the opportunity to put its best face forward and take steps to improve its record on human rights and religious freedom. Interview by the BBC World Service Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Jakarta, Indonesia April 4, 2008 QUESTION: The situation in Tibet has drawn the attention of your government recently. Yesterday China jailed a human rights activist for three and a half years. Where do you stand on the position of China’s hosting of the Olympics now? It was supposed to improve their human rights track record, and it doesn’t seem to have done that. ASSISTANT SECRETARY HILL: Well, first of all, we’re obviously very concerned about the developments in recent weeks. We’ve been especially concerned about the outbreak of violence and the apparent lack of restraint we’ve seen. The amount of destruction in Lhasa was certainly cause for great concern. We would like to see a much greater effort in dialogue. We know there were some efforts in the past between representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese authorities. We think this is the way to go, and we’d like to see some greater restraint. With respect to the Olympics, our President has been pretty clear that we don’t think it is appropriate to be boycotting Olympics or Olympic ceremonies. We don’t think this is going to solve a problem. And, as Secretary Rice made clear, we think that sort of activity can really be taken as great insult by the Chinese people, by 1.3 billion Chinese people. And I think it’s very important for people outside of China to understand the degree to which the Chinese are very proud of hosting these Olympics. This is not some government issue versus a popular issue. Everyone in China is very proud of this. And so people who sort of put this issue at play -- that is, talk about boycotting the Olympics in some respects -- need to understand that they are doing so in a way that could really cause problems with the sensitivities of Chinese people at large, not just the Chinese government. Jean Libby, editor of VietAm Review, compares this contradiction with a similar one of Christopher Hill and the State Dept.'s 2007 country report on Vietnam. Criticism from Vo Van Ai, director of QueMe, Action for Democracy in Vietnam was published by VietAm Review on March 13, 2008.    more »

PARIS, 28th December 2007 (IBIB) - In the wake of widespread demonstrations staged by students and young people outside Chinese Embassies in Hanoi and Saigon, and strong protests by the Vietnamese community overseas, the Most Venerable Thich Quang Do, prominent dissident and Deputy leader of the outlawed Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) has issued a strong statement on the controversy over the disputed Paracel and Spratly archipelagos. Sent clandestinely from the Thanh Minh Zen Monastery in Saigon, it was received by the International Buddhist Information Bureau in Paris today. Writing on behalf of the UBCV’s Bi-Cameral leadership (the Institute of the Sangha and the Institute for the Dissemination of the Dharma), Thich Quang Do called on the Hanoi authorities to “pass the reins of power to the people in a society based on the separation of the three powers, multi-party democracy and the rule of law” as the best way to safeguard Vietnam’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Because “three million Communist Party members and a 500,000-strong army have neither the authority nor the power to defend the homeland by military means, nor sufficient prestige and courage to expand political and diplomatic efforts to mobilize international support in our defence… they need the full participation of the 85 million Vietnamese population and the support of the Vietnamese Diaspora worldwide”. As a first step, Hanoi must “immediately abrogate Article 4 of the Vietnamese Constitution [on the political monopoly of the Communist Party], and enable all sectors of the Vietnamese population, including all religious and political families, to freely and fully participate in the process of national salvation”. The UBCV Deputy leader also called on Hanoi to summon the people for a “Dien Hong” Conference for the XXIst century” to initiate a process of reconciliation and democratic change. Thich Quang Do emphasized the role of Buddhism as an essential element in this process : “With our responsibility as Vietnamese citizens, and as representatives of a religion that has contributed to the foundation and development of our nation over the past 2,000 years, the Council of the Bi-Cameral Institute of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam cannot stand by silently whilst our country is in danger. We therefore solemnly appeal to the Vietnamese intelligentsia, inside and outside Vietnam, to stand together and rally forces to save our nation. The Council of the Bi-Cameral Institute of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam pledges to give its active support to every peaceful effort to protect our homeland and our people”. Interesting historical documentation from the Chinese Yuan Dynasty period. Conclusion: With our responsibility as Vietnamese citizens, and as representatives of a religion that has contributed to the foundation and development of our nation over the past 2,000 years, the Council of the Bi-Cameral Institute of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam cannot stand by silently whilst our country is in danger. We therefore call upon the Vietnamese intelligentsia, inside and outside Vietnam, to stand together and rally forces to save our nation. The Council of the Bi-Cameral Institute of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam pledges to give its active support to every peaceful effort to protect our homeland and our people.   more »

Description of history of invasions of Vietnamese archipelagos by China, particularly 1974 (South Vietnam) and 1988 (Socialist Vietnam). Protests secret treaty by Communist government. Praises demonstrations in Hanoi and Saigon. Signed by Bloc 8406 Acting Representatives - Do Nam Hai, Engineer, Saigon, Vietnam - Nguyen Chinh Ket, Professor, Saigon, Vietnam (On duty in overseas) - Tran Anh Kim, Former Officer of Armed Forces of Vietnam, Thai Binh Province, Vietnam - Peter Phan Van Loi, Roman Catholic Priest, City of Hue, Vietnam - Nguyen Xuan Nghia, Novelist, Hai Phong Province, Vietnam English version by Viet Si, San Jose, California, dedicated activist for Democracy & Human Rights in Vietnam   more »

The Vietnamese Canadian Federation, in collaboration with the Vietnamese Human Rights Association of Ontario, and the Vietnamese communities in Quebec and Ontario, will hold a demonstration in front of the embassies of China (515 St. Patrick St.) and Vietnam (470 Wilbrod St.) in Ottawa, from 12:30 p.m. to 2:30 p.m., on Saturday, December 22, 2007, to protest against the take-over of the Vietnamese archipelagoes of Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) and Truong Sa (Spratly Islands) by the Chinese government with the collusion of the Vietnamese Communist government.   more »

Vietnam Currents by Hai V. Tran returns to publication with the topic of students demonstrations in Vietnam in opposition to Chinese hegemony and historical roots in Communist takeover of Vietnam in 1975 and executions by Ho Chi Minh in the Land Reform of 1955-56. Articles in Vietnamese by [Fr] Phan Van Loi in Hue and Bloc 8406 dissident Vietnamese cite this history and encourage the students in Vietnam with spontaneous demonstrations.   more »

After the Geneva Agreements in 1954, Ho Chi Minh saw to it that several hundred young Cambodians were taken north, indoctrinated in communism and given military training. They were later armed and sent back, where they became the basis of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia’s Eastern Zone. Knowing of Ho’s close ties to Moscow and his intent to emulate his hero, the butcher Joseph Stalin, by creating a Soviet-style Union of South East Asia, China began training and arming the Pol Pot faction of the Khmer Rouge as a counterbalance to Soviet influence. North Vietnam enabled the Khmer Rouge to take over Phnom Penh in 1975 by providing logistics, ammunition, artillery and backup by Vietnamese troops making them complicate in the genocide of at least one and one half million Cambodians. The Vietnamese communists continue their policy of neo-colonization, nibbling away at Cambodia by annexing sizable portions of its borders, coastlines, and islands through illegitimate treaties with their puppet regime in Phnom Penh. Their latest method is a “Development Triangle” scheme that involves flooding three northeastern provinces of Cambodia and the three southeastern provinces of Laos with Vietnamese settlers. The Vietnamese army has already established coffee, cashew and rubber plantations in the Laotian provinces -- the latter covering more than 7,000 hectares. The similarity between the Vietnamese communists and the al Qaeda and the Muslim jihadists is that they are both fanatical true believers who see it as their divine right and destiny to establish hegemony over their respective regions, regardless of the cost in human life. American involvement in Vietnam was justified in trying to prevent the “dominos” -- the Southeast Asian nations -- from falling victim to communism. Likewise, the US must stay involved in Iraq to keep radical Islam from spreading throughout the region, and to prevent the eventual take over of Iraq by Iran – another “domino effect.” But if the defeatists in our own Congress succeed in raising the white flag over the US Capitol, America will once again have abandoning its allies -- and once again, terror and slaughter will follow. Michael Benge spent 11 years in Vietnam as a Foreign Service Officer, including five years as a Prisoner of war-- 1968-73 and is a student of South East Asian Politics. He is very active in advocating for human rights and religious freedom and has written extensively on these subjects.   more »

An effective and lasting strategic cooperation, such as NATO or the U.S.-Japan Alliance, requires that the partners share the same moral values and political ideology. In other words, only a free and democratic Vietnam, enjoying popular support and the support of the community of free nations can stand up to China's aggression and effectively contribute to regional security.   more »

Editor's Note: The killing of nine Vietnamese fishermen by the Chinese navy is a marker of China's aggressive designs on natural resources in the Eastern Sea. Thi Q. Lam is the author of The Twenty-Five Year Century; A South Vietnamese General Remembers the Indochina War to the Fall of Saigon. Article reprinted from Calitoday2, Vietnamese Communications.   more »

Editor's Note: A recent negotiation between Vietnam and China over the strategic Gulf of Tonkin shows China's regional ambitions. Author is a former general in the South Vietnamese Army and author of The Twenty Five Year Century. Reprinted from Calitoday2, Vietnamese Communications.   more »